The Solomon Amendment in 2005

Introduction
In a nation the size of the United States, there are competing interests of virtually every
degree in our day-to-day lives. Once in a while we come to an intersection of major concerns
that create a potential for great damage, either to individuals or to the general good of the whole.
When we reach these intersections it is imperative that we proceed with great care to avoid injury
if at all possible, and if not, that we minimize the injury to the greatest extent wisdom allows.
Recently the courts have encountered such an intersection in challenges to the Solomon
Amendment. At the crossroads of Congress’ power under the Spending Clause and the
cherished freedoms of speech provided by the First Amendment lies the prickly ground of the
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions. This crossroads is being navigated by the courts today.
This comment reviews the Solomon Amendment, its purpose and history. The challenges to
the law have resulted in contentious litigation, but not unlike challenges the courts have faced in
the past. After reviewing the past, this comment review the bases for each of the challenges in
the current litigation and discuss the similarities of the several challenges. The analysis that
followsdiscusses a single case as the flagship challenge and suggests that there is unlikely to be
any major shift in the statutory direction of Congress. Finally, this comment looks beyond a
final decision to the options available to the parties involved.
The Solomon Amendment
The Solomon Amendment, named for Representative Gerald Solomon of New York, was
introduced in the House of Representatives during the second session of the 103d Congress.1
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140 Cong. Rec. H3860-03, H3861.

The bill amended the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.2 The purpose of
the National Defense Authorization Act is to set military personnel strength and fund the budget
requirements of the Department of Defense. The language of Representative Solomon’s original
amendment required that no funds would be made available to any educational institution
through a Department of Defense contract or grant.3
The legislation ensured that federal funding, through the Department of Defense and in
support of educational institutions, was not spent in places where military recruiters were not
allowed on campus. The bill’s sponsor, Representative Solomon, expressed his frustration with
schools that accepted federal money but denied recruiters the opportunity to “explain[] the
benefits of an honorable career in our military.”4 The amendment withheld Department of
Defense funding provided “by grant or contract to any educational institution”5 that prevented
on-campus military recruitment by the Department of Defense.6
The Solomon Amendment passed through the House by a little better than a two-to-one
vote.7 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 was passed by the Senate
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The original text of Mr. Solomon’s amendment, entitled “Military Recruiting On Campus” is included here for
reference. (a) Denial of Funds. (1) No funds available to the Department of Defense may be provided by grant or
contract to any educational institution that has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the Secretary of
Defense from obtaining for military purposes – (A) entry to campuses or access to students on campuses; or (B)
access to directory information pertaining to students. (2) Students referred to in paragraph (1) are individuals who
are 17 years of age or older. (b) Procedures for Determination. The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Secretary of Education, shall prescribe regulations that contain procedures for determining if and when an
educational institution has denied or prevented access to students or information described in subsection (a). (c)
Definition. For purposes of this section, the term “directory information” means, with respect to a student, the
student’s name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, level of education, degrees received, and the most
recent previous educational institution enrolled in by the student. 140 Cong. Rec. H3860-03, H3861.
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and enacted as law a few months later.8 Since its debate in the House and subsequent enactment,
the Solomon Amendment has come under attack.9
The amendment was offered by Representative Gerald Solomon, a Republican congressman
from New York. Representative Solomon was a known supporter of the military, having served
in the United States Marine Corps.10 Though not the only member of Congress who might have
sponsored this legislation, his role in its introduction to the House seems a natural extension of
his work in Congress.11 There does not seem to be any particular event that sparked Rep.
Solomon to action; “[t]he apparent impetus for the Solomon Amendment was the continued
refusal of many educational institutions to allow the military to engage in on-campus
recruiting.”12
There have been several changes in the language of the amendment. “In 1997 Congress
amended the Solomon Amendment by expanding its penalty to include”13 four additional
departments beyond Defense,14 but the premise of the law has not been lost to Congress.15
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337 § 558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994)
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educational associations opposed to the amendment.
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Through the previous decade, and especially with President Clinton’s entry to the White
House, there grew an ever increasing animosity between homosexual special interests and the
military over the Defense Department’s policies dealing with homosexual conduct and stated
same-sex preferences for members in uniform.
During this period, the United States was involved in military conflict in Africa, South
America, and Europe. At the same time, the military was reducing its size at the conclusion of
the Cold War. Even though there were reductions in progress, there continued a need to recruit
new personnel to meet the future needs of the military and to replace the many service members
who were taking the opportunity to retire early or enter into civilian careers. Clinton, having
come into office in 1992, had made an effort to fulfill a campaign promise to allow homosexuals
to serve in the military. The President and his senior military advisors came to a compromise
policy, now known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” standard. The compromise did not create a
new era of open accession into the military for homosexuals, but it did allow homosexuals who
were in the military to remain and those who were willing to keep their preferences to
themselves the opportunity to enter and serve in uniform.
The military policy did not comport with the non-discrimination policies of many colleges
and universities around the country. Through the 1980s, many schools had adopted policies
which limited employers who were allowed to recruit on campus.
A. Rules Implicated at a Legal Intersection
1. Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause
The Constitution expressly gives Congress the right and the duty to collect taxes and spend
those proceeds for the general welfare of the country.16 Congress’ spending power is well-
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established. The Supreme Court has held Congress has wide latitude under the spending clause
to use funding to encourage compliance with its policy preferences.17 There are limitations to
Congress’ power18 but its broad power to spend has fewer restrictions than its ability to directly
regulate activity through legislation.19 As examples, Congress may not require that states raise
the minimum drinking age but may condition highway funding on state legislation that raises the
age to twenty-one.20 Nor may Congress require that libraries install filters on internet computers
open to the public, but Congress may withhold internet and computer funding from libraries that
do not install those filters.21
The Constitution provides, even requires, that Congress is responsible for both the common
defense and the general welfare of the nation. The general welfare can be provided for by
regulating the actions of other governmental actors, the creation and operation of governmental
agencies, or the direct funding of public needs. The last option, essentially the redistribution of
wealth, results in the greatest surrender of Congressional control over the use of funds. The
control of those funds is retained when Congress can refuse to continue funding if the recipient
does not comply with Congress’ purposes in providing the funding.
2. Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions is related to the spending clause. This doctrine
provides that Congress may not withhold funding based on conditions that require the recipient
to give up some other guaranteed right.22 This doctrine limits Congress’ ability under the
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spending clause to induce compliance from a recipient. There must already be some right to
receive the funding. Examples here might be that Congress cannot condition veteran’s tax
benefits on the recipient’s taking a loyalty oath.23 Nor may Congress condition federal funding
to broadcasting stations on the stations’ restraint from editorializing.24
3. First Amendment Rights of Free Speech and Association
The right of free speech is one of the most cherished constitutional guarantees enjoyed by
Americans. The right of free speech is not unlimited, but several types of expression are
protected. Political speech is protected where the speaker wishes to positively express him or
herself.25 The reverse of that positive expression is also protected in that a speaker cannot be
compelled to speak for another; in particular, the government may not compel a speaker.26
Related to the right of free speech is the right to associate with others and thereby express some
common opinion.27 The right of association does not require that a group express itself, only that
it have the opportunity to do so.28 The violation of these rights is subject to a standard of strict
scrutiny.29
II. Solomon Amendment Litigation
1. Background Litigation
As part of the background for the Solomon Amendment, there were several cases that may
have had some influence on Representative Solomon. The suits which follow, suits against law
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6

schools and the government that seek to deny military recruiters any presence on college
campuses, illustrate the issues that likely frustrated Rep. Solomon.
In United States v. City of Philadelphia,30 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
lower court’s summary judgment, limiting a local order that prohibited Temple University Law
School from supporting military recruitment.31 Several students and a student organization
brought a complaint to the city human resources office alleging violations of the city’s fair
employment ordinances.32 The plaintiffs argued that because the military discriminated against
homosexuals, the law school had violated fair employment opportunities by allowing military
recruiters to exclude from interviews any gay and lesbian students. The city’s Commission on
Human Relations entered an order against Temple University Law School, disallowing military
recruiters on-campus.33 The military brought suit, joined by the law school, to avoid the order as
a violation of the Supremacy Clause.34 The circuit court held the city ordinance was in conflict
with Congressional policy and could not be permitted to restrict military recruitment.35 The
federal law preempted the local ordinance only because the two were not compatible, not
because Congress had moved to supplant state law.36 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
returned to and distinguished this decision in Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.
v. Rumsfeld, discussed below in this comment.37
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FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 234 n.15 (distinguished from City of Philadelphia because the law school in City of
Philadelphia had invited the military as opposed to having the military recruiters imposed upon the school in FAIR
and because there was no preemption question in FAIR).
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Shortly before the Solomon Amendment was first enacted, the Federal District Court for the
District of Minnesota held that recruitment was commercial speech that could be restricted in
Nomi v. Regents for the University of Minnesota.38 Plaintiff, Brian Nomi, was a student who
sued the University of Minnesota Law School seeking an injunction against the school’s nondiscrimination policy.39 Nomi argued that the school’s policy was an unconstitutional limit on
his First Amendment right to hear the recruitment message of the U.S. military or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.40 The defendant characterized the recruitment message as commercial
speech that could be restricted by the state where there was an important governmental interest.41
The court agreed first that recruitment speech was commercial speech, “speech proposing a
commercial transaction.”42 The court also agreed that the interest of the school in promoting
equal opportunity was a sufficiently important governmental interest.43 The court allowed the
law school to keep its non-discrimination policy and Nomi’s appeal was vacated as moot because
he had graduated by the time the court of appeals heard his case.44
In Gay and Lesbian Law Students Association (GLLSA) v. Board of Trustees,45 the law
school faculty, certain students, and a student organization sued the University of Connecticut
for violations of state law that protected sexual orientation.46 In 1991 the Connecticut legislature
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passed a Gay Rights Law.47 The Connecticut law prohibited state entities from discriminating on
the basis of sexual orientation and specifically prohibited such discrimination by “placement
services provided by state agencies.”48 The legislature included “educational institutions, which
provide employment referrals or placement services.”49 The Gay Rights Law excepted from its
prohibitions the conduct and administration of Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs on
college campuses.50 The Connecticut Supreme Court made clear, however, that the state law
would not require any greater assistance to the military than provided other discriminatory
employers.51 The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the state law and affirmed a permanent
injunction against the university, prohibiting military recruiters from using the law school’s
career placement services.52
These three cases highlight the trend against military recruitment on law school campuses.
The non-discrimination policies of the nation’s law schools, which began in the late 1970s,53
began to set an unwelcome tone for the U.S. military through the 1980s. By the time the
Solomon Amendment was proposed, the military was enduring many stresses through the early
1990s. These stresses included the draw down of troops at the close of the Cold War coupled
with increasing overseas military commitments such as the Gulf War in Iraq and peacekeeping
47

46a C.G.S. § 46a-81a (2005).

48

46a C.G.S. § 46a-81j, “Sexual orientation discrimination: Job recruitment and placement services provided by
state agencies.”
49
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GLLSA, 673 A.2d at 499. The defendant argued that Connecticut law required military recruiters must be allowed
access to on-campus recruiting according to 10a C.G.S. § 10a-149a, “Military recruiters; access to directory
information and on-campus recruiting.” That law was in force before the Gay Rights law was adopted, but was
subsequently repealed in 1997 and replaced by § 10a-149c which only required that military access to school
directories was only required from state schools to the extent required to keep the school in compliance with federal
law and to prevent the loss of federal funding.
52
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efforts in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Given the accompanying budget difficulties the
federal government was working through, it is not surprising that Representative Solomon might
have been frustrated by impediments to military recruiting being erected by certain institutions of
higher learning.
2. Current Litigation
This series of cases, primarily in the northeast United States, attack the Solomon Amendment
as unconstitutional. The cases, all in federal court,54 follow a similar line of arguments. The
plaintiffs in these cases variously represent law school faculties, law school students, student
organizations, and national law school organizations. The claims of these plaintiffs center on
non-discrimination policies that have been in place since the late 1970s.55 The nondiscrimination policies include sexual orientation as a protected class.56 In each case, the nondiscrimination policies applied to the law school’s career placement service.57 The career
placement service or office at each school required potential employers to sign an assurance to
the school that the employer did not discriminate in any way which violated the school’s non-
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Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004); Burt v. Rumsfeld 2005
WL 273205 (D. Conn. 2005); Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Conn. 2004);
Burbank v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 1925532 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
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FAIR, 390 F.3d at 224; Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193.

56

Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390; Burbank 2004 WL 1925532 at 2; see also Gay and
Lesbian Law Students Association (GLLSA) v. Bd. of Trustees, 673 A.2d 484, 487 (Conn. 1996) (claiming a
violation of state law). The American Association of Law Schools (AALS), a non-profit association of law schools
voted in 1990 “to include sexual orientation as a protected category in law school non-discrimination policies.”
FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
Most law schools have an office of career placement service whose job it is to help students and graduates
locate employment and to help employers find and hire students and graduates from the school. Other services
offered include skill training for job interviews, resume writing, and other job counseling for the students.
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Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390; Burbank 2004 WL 1925532 at 2; see also GLLSA,
673 A.2d at 487. The AALS policy also directed career placement services should not be made available to
noncompliant employers. FAIR, 390 F.3d at 225.
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discrimination policy.58 If an employer could not or would not sign the assurance, the law school
refused to allow that employer access to the career placement facilities.59 Congress directed that
Department of Defense policy should not allow homosexuals to serve if they acknowledge their
sexual orientation or commit homosexual acts.60 Military recruiters were unable to comply with
the law school non-discrimination policies as a result.61 In an effort to preserve the consistency
of their non-discrimination policies, the law school faculty, students, and organizations in these
cases sought to prevent the military from participating in on-campus recruiting efforts.62
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld
The first of the four federal cases is styled Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.
v. Rumsfeld (FAIR).63 In September, 2003, a group of law school faculty organizations and
students came together as groups and individually to challenge the United States’ military’s
application of the Solomon Amendment. The District Court faced two issues; first whether the
plaintiffs had legal standing and second, whether the plaintiffs’ motion for injunction had
“established a likelihood of success on the merits.”64
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Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390; Burbank 2004 WL 1925532 at 2. Contra GLLSA,
673 A.2d at 487 (quoting in footnote 4, stipulated fact 9., the specific exception for written certification from
military recruiters). The AALS policy directed career placement services to obtain “written assurance” of
compliance from employers. FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 280-81.

59

Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390; Burbank 2004 WL 1925532 at 2 (military directed to
the Univ. of Pa. Office of Career Services, rather than using the law school Career Planning and Placement Office);
see also GLLSA, 673 A.2d at 487 (quoting in footnote 4, stipulated fact 9., that written certification was required
before interviews were allowed).
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Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390; Burbank 2004 WL 1925532 at 2; see also GLLSA,
673 A.2d at 487 (quoting in footnote 4, stipulated fact 11., allowing the military to amend or omit the law school
non-discrimination certification).
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FAIR, 390 F.3d at 231; FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 281-82; Burt, 2005 WL 273205 at 1; Burt, 322 F. Supp.2d at
198; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94; Burbank, 2004 WL 1925532 at 3.
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The first issue faced by this court was the question of standing. The government, the
defendant in this case, argued that the plaintiffs were third parties here, without an injury that
was personal to them and that could be remedied by the court.65 The plaintiffs were numerous
and need to be described in order to understand the breadth of interests represented.
The first named plaintiff is “an association of law schools and law faculties”66 called the
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR). The organization is described as a
“membership corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey.”67 The district court
described FAIR as follows:
Membership is open to law schools, other academic institutions, and faculties that
vote by a majority to join. FAIR’s stated mission is ‘to promote academic
freedom, support educational institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate
the rights of institutions of higher education.’ With few exceptions, FAIR
membership is kept secret.68 (citations omitted)
The second named plaintiff is another organization, the Society of American Law Teachers,
Inc. (SALT).69 This New York corporation includes a membership of “nearly 900” law school
faculty members.70 SALT members are committed “to making the legal profession more
inclusive and to extending the power of the law to underserved individuals and communities.”71
In addition to these two groups, two individual law school professors, Erwin Chemerinsky of
the University of Southern California Law School and Sylvia Law of the New York University
65

Id. at 285.

66

Id. at 275.

67

FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
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Id.
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Id. at 274.
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Id. at 275.
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Id.
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Law School, are also plaintiffs.72 The faculty organizations and individual professors represent a
geographically large area, covering the width of the United States.
Finally, there are two student groups and three individual students who have joined as
plaintiffs. The student groups include the Coalition for Equality of Boston College Law School
and the Rutgers Gay and Lesbian Caucus of Rutgers University School of Law.73 The three
individual students are all from Rutgers.74
The plaintiffs named as defendants six United States department secretaries including
Defense, Education, Labor, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Homeland
Security.75 The departments all contribute to the grants and federal contracts that spend “billions
of dollars”76 each year in the country’s many institutions of higher learning. The Solomon
Amendment restricts funding from all these departments, not just the Department of Defense.77
This suit was brought to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the funding restrictions of the
Solomon Amendment.78 The plaintiffs argued that the law was unconstitutional on its face
“because Congress cannot command law schools even to admit the military to campus” with a
message that is in conflict with the law schools’ stated mission and goals.79 The plaintiffs also
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Id. at 275-76.
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FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
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10 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1).
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FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
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Id. at 297.
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argued the law was unconstitutional as applied by the military.80 According to the law schools,
the military was requiring “affirmative assistance” that involved an expenditure of resources.81
“Plaintiffs contend that the Solomon Amendment is unconstitutional because
it (1) conditions a benefit – federal funding – on the surrendering of law schools’
First Amendment rights of academic freedom, free speech, and freedom of
expressive association; (2) discriminates on the basis of viewpoint by promoting
only a pro-military recruiting message and by punishing only those schools that
exclude the military because they find the military’s policy against homosexual
conduct morally objectionable; and (3) violates the void-for-vagueness doctrine
for lack of clear guidelines and for conferring unbridled discretion on military
bureaucrats to decide which institutions to target and what acts or omissions
amount to non-compliance with the statute.”82
At issue was the non-discrimination policy adopted at most accredited American law
schools.83 The policy includes sexual orientation as a protected category of people.84 The nondiscrimination policy includes law school career placement services and does not allow the
expenditure of school resources to support the recruiting efforts of employers that discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation.85 The policy does not restrict the students’ freedom to seek
employment with any employer they may choose, but the students must go to the employers.86
Plaintiffs argue that the Solomon Amendment is unconstitutional on its face and that the
80

Id.

81

Id.
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Id. at 274-75.
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FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 280.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

14

Department of Defense interpretation and enforcement of the statute is unconstitutional as it is
applied.87
The government moved to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
sue.88 First, the government argued that the law schools were not “entitled to bring suit on their
own behalf and potentially against the wishes of the parent institution.”89 Second, the
government pointed out that the parent institutions, not the plaintiffs, were in the position to
make a decision whether or not to comply with the Solomon Amendment.90 Finally, the law
schools were suing as third-party litigants on behalf of parent universities that had not chosen to
be part of the suit.91
As an employer, the Department of Defense sends military recruiters to colleges and
universities all over the country in search of candidates to fill a wide variety of jobs, including
legal professionals. The military has a long-standing policy against homosexual activity.92 The
policy is codified into U.S. law93 and traces a history that reaches back to 1916 when assault with
intent to commit sodomy became reason for discharge.94 The need for qualified candidates and
the regulations prohibiting homosexual activity mean that military recruiters are unwelcome at
law schools that enforce the non-discrimination policy.95 The court in this case held that the
plaintiffs did have standing.
87

Id. at 297.

88

Id. at 285.
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FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
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Id.
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Id.

92

Id. at 281; 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13) (1993).
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10 U.S.C. § 654 (2005).
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Nat’l Def. Research Inst., RAND, MR-323-OSD, Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: Options
and Assessment 3-4, (1993).
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FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
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The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.96 Plaintiffs had the
burden of establishing they had a “reasonable likelihood” of success on the merits, that they were
likely to suffer “irreparable harm” if not granted relief, that the harm they might suffer would be
greater than the harm to the defendant if the injunction were granted, and that the injunction was
in the public interest.97
Burt v. Rumsfeld
In Burt v. Rumsfeld the faculty of Yale Law School brought suit against Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld in his official capacity as the Secretary of Defense.98 The faculty consisted of fortyfive faculty members, one of whom chose to represent himself on a slightly different claim.99
The faculty brought suit to enjoin the Department of Defense from enforcing the Solomon
Amendment. They argued that the Solomon Amendment and 32 C.F.R. 216.4(c)(3) were
unconstitutional both on their face and as applied to Yale Law School.100 Further, the plaintiffs
argued that the “equal access requirement of 32 C.F.R. § 216.4(c)(3) [was] not a reasonable
interpretation of the Amendment.”101
The Secretary of Defense moved to dismiss the action claiming the faculty lacked
standing.102 The defense argued that the proper party to the action should have been Yale
University, not faculty at Yale Law School, because the university would be the party to suffer

96

Id. at 275.
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Id. at 296.
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Burt v. Rumsfeld, 322 F. Supp. 2d 189, 196 (D. Conn. 2004).
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Id. at 196. The faculty members, as a group, based their claim on the assertion that they were forced to
communicate a significantly different message than they would have chosen. Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 159.
Professor Rubenfeld’s argument is “slightly different” from the rest of the faculty. He claims that law compels him
to adopt the military’s message as his own. Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 159-60.
100

Id.

101

Id.
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16

the loss of funding, not the law school faculty.103 A motion to dismiss required the court to
consider both standing and ripeness.104
The court first applied the three-part test to determine whether the faculty had standing. The
test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “(1) an injury in fact; (2) caused by the conduct
complained of; (3) and that such injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.”105 The court noted that “[t]he defendant [had] not contested redressability”106 and did
not address that part of the test.
The court found the faculty met the first part of the test, having suffered injury. The faculty
was “compelled” to suspend their non-discrimination policy in order to avoid the loss of
Department of Defense funding to the university.107 The suspension was an impairment of their
freedom of speech and association.108 This injury was suffered specifically by the faculty. The
faculty was responsible for the non-discrimination policy, not the university.109 The faculty had
decided to apply the policy to “all aspects of law school life” and the compelled suspension of
the policy was a violation of their free speech right.110
The conduct of the Department of Defense consisted of the threat of loss of federal funding
that would impact not only Yale Law School but also the other schools in the Yale University
system.111 The threat by the Department of Defense led directly to the suspension of the law
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school’s non-discrimination policy.112 The threat was the cause of the injury that the faculty
suffered. The court went on to add that even if Yale University were seen as the financially
injured party, the law school faculty was the constitutionally injured party because it was the law
school’s non-discrimination policy (as opposed to a University policy) that had been stifled.113
The court next turned to the question of ripeness. The defendant argued that no decision had
been made to suspend financial benefits to Yale University or any of its schools, so the claim
was not ripe for review.114 The court held the question was ripe because the regulation that had
resulted in injury to the plaintiff was final and was being challenged here.115 The court further
found that the faculty had suspended the non-discrimination policy on the threat of funding loss
alone.116 The court held the challenge was ripe because a concrete and ongoing injury had been
sustained by the faculty that could not be remedied without judicial intervention.117
The court held the plaintiffs had standing and the issue was ripe for review. As a result, the
defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied.118 This decision in June, 2004, cleared the way for
the plaintiffs to pursue their injunction claim.
Having settled the standing and ripeness issue, the plaintiffs in Burt brought their claims
forward.119 The faculty sought summary judgment on their claims.120 Their first claim was that
the law school had not violated the Solomon Amendment because recruiting at Yale Law School
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took place off-campus.121 The Solomon Amendment only applied to on-campus recruiting so the
law school had not violated the statute. The second claim was that even if the law school had
violated the Solomon Amendment, the law was an unconstitutional condition on a federal
benefit.122
The court held that the Yale Law School did violate the Solomon Amendment because access
to the official recruiting programs required employers to comply with the school’s nondiscrimination policy.123 Plaintiffs argued that the military had the same opportunity as any
other employer who wished to recruit on-campus, all the military had to do was sign the nondiscrimination policy.124 The court refused to equate “opportunity” with access to the school’s
recruiting program.125 The language of the Solomon Amendment plainly required access that
was “at least equal in quality and scope”126 to the access provided other recruiters. The law
school’s Career Development Office was located on-campus and offered access through its
official website.127 Those services were not available to military recruiters because they could
not comply with the non-discrimination policy. The military was “effectively prevented”
complete access in violation of the statute.128
The court also held that the Solomon Amendment imposed an unconstitutional condition on
the faculty of Yale Law School.129 The government argued that the Solomon Amendment was
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nothing more than the lawful exercise of Congress’ power under the Spending Clause.130 The
court disagreed that this was a simple exercise of spending authority. Congress may not use its
spending authority to coerce or compel a party to forego some other constitutionally guaranteed
right.131 The court noted that, “the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that, even though a
person may not be entitled by right to a valuable benefit and ‘even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely.’”132 The court found that the faculty had suspended their nondiscrimination policy to prevent the loss of funds to Yale University and the defense conceded
the suspension was a result of the Solomon Amendment requirements.133 Congressional
authority under the Spending Clause had exceeded the allowed coercion and turned to
“compulsion.”134
The compulsion of the Solomon Amendment worked to deny the faculty its right of free
speech.135 The right of free speech includes not only the right to speak out, but the right to
remain silent.136 It also includes the right to refrain from speaking for another person or the
government.137 The government may not compel an individual to aid a third party in
disseminating a message with which the individual does not agree.138 The faculty had been
coerced into disseminating the message of the Department of Defense in violation of the
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faculty’s stated non-discrimination policy.139 The abridgement of the right to free speech
resulted in an unconstitutional condition that Congress could not impose on the faculty at Yale
Law School.
In similar fashion, the court found that the faculty was denied its right of free association.
Using the test the Supreme Court established in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 140 the court
found the law school faculty was an expressive association whose viewpoint had been
significantly affected by the government.141 The “key” in Dale was the “substantial” deference
given to the organization to determine both its message and what would interfere with the
expression of that message.142 In this case, the faculty had established their message through
their non-discrimination policy.143 The Solomon Amendment required that the faculty now be
associated with the message of the Department of Defense, a message with which the faculty
wished to disassociate.144 This interference had a significant affect on the faculty’s desired
message that constituted an unconstitutional condition.145
The court applied strict scrutiny to both the free speech and free association rights to
determine if perhaps the government’s action could be justified.146 Strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard because the right at issue is a First Amendment interest.147 The compelling
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state interest, raising and maintaining a military, was not challenged by the plaintiffs and
assumed by the court.148 The compelling interest, however, must be accomplished by a narrowly
tailored means.149
SAME v. Rumsfeld
A companion case to Burt v. Rumsfeld was brought by two student organizations of Yale
Law School. In SAME v. Rumsfeld,150 student organizations representing lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender students151 brought suit against the Secretary of Defense. The two organizations
were groups called SAME, which stands for Student/Faculty Alliance for Military Equality, and
Outlaws.152 The plaintiffs in this case argue violations of their First and Fifth Amendment rights
as a result of the military’s interpretation and application of the Solomon Amendment.153 As in
the Burt case, the defense moved to dismiss the suit for lack of standing and because the issue
was not ripe.154
The court addressed four injuries asserted by the plaintiffs. The claims of the plaintiffs
included impairment of their First Amendment rights of expressive association, to receive or hear
the message of another, and to express a particular viewpoint, and a violation of their equal
protection rights under the Fifth Amendment.155
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The court began its discussion with a brief review of the requirements for standing of
associations, which includes a greater burden than required of an individual.156 An association
can sue on behalf of one or more of its members if it can show, “(1) that their members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) that the interests they seek to protect are
germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”157 The defense had not
challenged the standing of the plaintiffs to represent their members.158 The court found that the
requirements for standing were met by these two associations because any of the individual
members could also have asserted these claims.159
The court first granted the defense motion to dismiss on the plaintiff claim based on a right of
expressive association.160 The court held that the law school faculty, a proper party in Burt v.
Rumsfeld,161 had created and were solely responsible for the law school’s non-discrimination
policy.162 Neither the students nor the student associations had “an institutional voice” in that
policy.163 The students were “patrons” of the institution that had created the policy, not
members, so the student associations could not claim an injury on behalf of the students.164
On the other hand, the court held that the plaintiffs did have a right to receive the message of
the law school faculty. The right to express an opinion is pointless unless others have a right to
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hear and receive that information.165 Having determined that the faculty had a right to express a
particular associational preference, the court held that the individual students enjoyed a right to
receive that message from the faculty.166 The actions of the military in applying the Solomon
Amendment impaired the students’ right to receive the faculty’s message. This injury was
specific to the students and the court denied the defense motion to dismiss based on this claim.167
The next claimed injury was an impairment of the students’ right to express a particular
viewpoint. The court held that, like the expressive association claim, the faculty had expressed a
particular viewpoint through the non-discrimination policy.168 The students asserted that they
had chosen to come to Yale Law School because of the viewpoint expressed in the nondiscrimination policy.169 The court held that “the mere fact that [the students] agree with the law
faculty’s viewpoint does not make their own viewpoint the target of the discrimination.”170 The
defense motion to dismiss was granted on this claim because the plaintiffs were not the injured
party.171
The last claimed injury was a violation of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.172
The students claim that Congress “singled out gays and lesbians” in passing the Solomon
Amendment as punishment for those universities that protested the military “Don’t Ask Don’t
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Tell” policy.173 The plaintiffs argue that gay and lesbian students have born the full brunt of the
suspension of the law school’s non-discrimination policy.174 Plaintiffs argue that the
discrimination against these students that has resulted bears no relation to any legitimate
governmental objective.175 The court held that this claim was at least sufficient to establish
standing and the defense motion to dismiss was denied.176
Having found potential injury-in-fact on two of the four claims, the court next addressed
whether there was a causal link between the claimed injuries and the actions of the military in
enforcing the statute. The court held that the Department of Defense’ actions were “fairly
traceable” to the Yale Law School faculty’s decision to suspend the non-discrimination policy.177
The court held that the suspension of the non-discrimination policy caused both injuries to the
students; they could no longer receive the non-discrimination message and they had suffered a
loss of equal protection.178 The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the plaintiffs’
claims of a right to receive information and equal protection.179
Finally, the court held that “this matter [was] ripe for adjudication” for the same reasons that
had been provided in Burt.180 The suspension of the school’s non-discrimination policy was
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effective based on the loss of funding threat alone, and the issue would be no more ripe if the
Department of Defense took final action against Yale University to cut off funding. The
defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness was denied.181
Burbank v. Rumsfeld
The last federal case in this review is Burbank v. Rumsfeld. 182 In this case, the plaintiffs
included faculty members, students, and a student organization all of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School.183 The claims in this case were very similar to the claims in FAIR,
Burt, and SAME. The claims and standing issues were so similar, the court summarized the
claims of the plaintiffs as “the same types of injuries-in-fact held sufficient to confer standing”
on the various plaintiffs in those cases, citing each.184 Similarly, the defense made the same
motions to dismiss for lack of standing.185 This court found no new arguments from either side
and came to the same holdings as the courts in FAIR, Burt, and SAME.186 The end result was
that the defense motion to dismiss was denied because the plaintiffs did have standing to sue on
First Amendment grounds.187 The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was also denied,
because the court found that there were still issues of fact that remained.188
III. Analysis of Recent Decisions
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Plaintiffs in the recent litigation have followed similar strategies in attacking the Solomon
Amendment. In each case, the plaintiffs claimed First Amendment violations directed at the
suppression of the non-discrimination policies of the law schools. The faculties claim to have
suffered the loss of their freedom to express their opposition to the discriminatory policy of the
United States military. The students and student organizations claim to have lost their freedoms
to express their opposition to the military policies and their freedoms to hear the messages of the
faculty at the schools where the students attend.
The FAIR case is the oldest of this series, having begun at the district court level in 2003.
The District Court for the District of New Jersey held in favor of the government in that case,
granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss. That case was appealed and the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court in 2004. That reversal meant the plaintiffs
won their injunction against the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.189 The government
has appealed and the Supreme Court has agreed to hear this case, but not until the next session
which begins in October of 2005.190
Litigation of the more recent cases has continued, but may slow until the Supreme Court
decides FAIR. As of this writing, the plaintiffs in the Burt case have appealed to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.191 Plaintiffs in Burbank have not decided to continue immediately
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with an appeal, choosing to wait the pending outcome at the Supreme Court.192 The issues raised
in FAIR will likely, then, also become dispositive in these other cases.
The New Jersey District Court opinion included a careful discussion of each of the issues,
which include the intersection of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the spending clause,
and the first amendment rights of freedom of speech and expressive association. This analysis
continues by covering each issue in the order of that opinion and comparing it to the holdings of
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The recurring disagreement will be what interests to balance
and the degree of balancing.
Like the funds at issue in the Solomon Amendment, the parties are contesting whose rights
are more important. None of the rights mentioned have yet been declared absolute. There is no
Congressional right that is absolute under the spending clause. That is the substance of the
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions. Congress has no absolute right to impair or deny rights
guaranteed by the Constitution by withholding benefits that are otherwise due to an individual or
an organization. The Court has given Congress wide latitude under the Spending Clause, but
there are limits. Similarly, there is not an absolute right of free speech under the First
Amendment. The Court has imbued this crucial freedom with great value and purpose, yet that
right is not absolute and can be restrained under appropriate circumstances.
The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions states that government may not impose
conditions on the grant of funds “in order achieve indirectly those regulatory ends that the
Constitution prohibits it from achieving directly.”193 This doctrine prevents the government
from, in effect, buying off individual rights. The rights citizens have acquired through the
Constitution should not be held hostage to spending power of the government. Certainly the
192
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federal government has great spending power and Congress through its powers under the
Spending Clause can wield great influence, if not coercion. To protect against the abuse of this
power, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions makes an assumption about the bargaining
position of the individual before restricting the power of Congress to influence an individual’s
behavior. The doctrine assumes that the individual has some legal or legitimate claim to a right
that he or she may relinquish. The right might be an express provision of the Constitution or a
statutory provision made available to anyone who might qualify by a created set of standards.
Statutory provision are sometimes referred to as entitlements and should not be withheld from a
qualifying individual without good cause. A violation of the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine results when government attempts to force an individual to choose between one of two
rights, foregoing one in favor of the other.
In their challenge to the Solomon Amendment, the plaintiffs charge that Congress has
attempted to wrest away their First Amendment rights by denying funding in the form of grants
and contracts from federal agencies. Plaintiffs claim Congress is seeking to exchange the law
schools’ freedoms of speech and expressive association in return for continued funding.
Certainly the plaintiffs have legal claim to their First Amendment rights. The issue is whether
the plaintiffs have relinquished those rights in favor of continued funding.
The difference of opinion between the district court and the circuit court of appeals in FAIR
rests upon whether the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs are absolute. The circuit court
implied that the plaintiffs’ rights are absolute and any imposition on those rights will violate the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.194 The district court noted that not even First
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Amendment rights were absolute.195 This basic difference in entering arguments drives the
conclusions of each court and explains the different outcomes.
The one conclusion both courts agree on is the status of the law schools as expressive
associations. The district court relies upon the Court’s three-step process in Dale to analyze a
group’s expressive association claim.196 The first step in that process is to determine whether a
group qualifies as an expressive association in order to make a claim of protection under the First
Amendment. The law schools meet the de minimus threshold for such an association that
includes a group that “merely engage[s] in some sort of expression” 197 or no expression at all.198
The district and circuit courts disagree as to whether the Solomon Amendment significantly
interferes or affects the law schools’ ability to express themselves. The district court held that
interference was to be measured in degrees. Relying on the conclusion that the law schools’
right to freedom of expressive association was not absolute, the court held the military recruiters
were only “periodic” visitors whose presence on the campuses was only incidental.199 The
district court went further to explain why a military presence was only incidental and did not rise
to the level of unconstitutionality. The court described two possible speech violations that could
significantly interfere with the law schools’ rights, suppression or compulsion.200 Message
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suppression is referred to by the court using the terms “message dilution” and the “muddling of
the speaker’s message.”201
The court distinguished Dale, holding that the military message of discrimination complained
of in FAIR could be overwhelmed by the plaintiffs.202 The message of the military would be lost
in the expression of the law schools, whose message of nondiscrimination and opposition to the
military policy would come through “loud and clear.”203 The district court also distinguished
Hurley, which the plaintiffs had relied upon to support their claim of compelled speech.204 The
military defendants in FAIR did not seek to express a contrary message in recruiting on
campus.205 In Hurley, the Court struck down an antidiscrimination law that the plaintiffs in that
case had relied upon to force their inclusion in a parade.206 The message of the military, if one
could be found, is not necessarily consistent with the message of the law schools, but does not
significantly interfere with the law schools’ freedom of expression.
The circuit court relied solely upon Dale and held that the law schools’ freedom of
expression was significantly affected only because the law schools so asserted.207 The circuit
court ended its analysis of the plaintiffs as expressive association here. In Dale, the Supreme
Court gave deference to the Boy Scouts of America to determine what expression it would assert
and what would impair that expression.208 The Court further held, however, that an expressive
association could not “erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that
201
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mere acceptance of a member form a particular group would impair its message.”209 According
to the circuit court, FAIR is to be given all deference, upon its assertion alone, that its message is
impaired. The Dale Court, though, should not be understood to equate deference with
capitulation and the circuit court’s omission of any discussion of tempered deference subjects it
to possible reversal on review.
The district court’s holding that the law schools’ rights are not significantly impaired results
in another level of analysis, standard of scrutiny. FAIR argued that the court should apply strict
scrutiny; a fundamental right such as the freedom of speech rights implicated here normally
would require strict scrutiny.210 The district court relied upon the standards set out in Dale and
held that strict scrutiny applied where government action directly burdened expression.211 The
law schools were not so burdened. The Solomon Amendment was not aimed at any particular
expression, only indirectly burdening the law schools. The burden on the law schools was
created, arguably, by their own expression of the non-discrimination policies. The alternative to
a rigorous standard of scrutiny is that standard adopted when governmental action results in an
indirect burden on expression, or where the burden is incidental.212 The district court applied the
standards indicated by O’Brien.213 O’Brien burned his draft card and challenged his prosecution
as an unconstitutional restriction on his freedom of symbolic speech.214 The Court held the
incidental burden on O’Brien’s free speech rights were justified by the government’s substantial
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interests in lawful conscription and the narrow tailoring of a law which had an incidental impact
on noncommunicative conduct.215
The standards of O’Brien permit a governmental restriction “if [that restriction] is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.”216 The district court in FAIR found the government interest in
raising and supporting an army and navy were both within the power of the government and a
substantial and important interest.217 The court also found the Solomon Amendment did not
target speech. The statute did not deny funds based on any particular viewpoint, especially one
created by the school, but funds were denied based on the conduct of any school which denied
access to military recruiters.218 Finally, the court noted that narrow tailoring was not required
under the lower standard of intermediate scrutiny and this law was reasonable in furthering the
interest of Congress in raising an army and a navy.219
The circuit court applied strict scrutiny and sharply disagreed with the district court that the
tests of O’Brien should be applied.220 The circuit court would never have reached the O’Brien
tests, concluding that those tests were not necessary when the speaker is protected on other First
Amendment grounds.221 FAIR was protected by the First Amendment as an expressive
association and against compelled speech and the majority opinion would suggest that these
215
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protections are more than sufficient to protect the law schools’ act of denying access to military
recruiters. This circuit court position seems to be in direct opposition to the original holding in
O’Brien, however.
The circuit court argues that because the law schools have made a verbal or written
expression in the form of a non-discrimination policy, their conduct in preventing military
recruiter access to campuses is also protected. The expression and the conduct were separated by
the Court in O’Brien and are likely to be separated in this instance as well. The O’Brien holding
does not seek to suppress the freedom of expression, but acts or conduct contrary to legitimate
governmental operation should not be permitted as obstacles to the general welfare and defense.
In this case, the law schools are free to oppose any military policy or governmental action they
wish, but they should not obstruct the legitimate operation of the federal government in the
course of that expression. Congress is required to raise and maintain an army and recruiting is a
necessary and legitimate function to meet that mandate. The Supreme Court is unlikely to
overturn O’Brien on these facts where conduct can be separated from expression.
As is so often the case, entering assumptions have driven the results in the opinions
surrounding the Solomon Amendment. The dissent in the circuit court decision emphasized that
the court there should have opened with the assumption that all acts of Congress are
constitutional.222 Had the majority begun with the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment,
the law schools would have the burden of demonstrating first that their expressions of nondiscrimination were actually violated by the presence of military recruiters.223 If the law schools
could make that connection, then, and only then, the court would have been correct to reach a
First Amendment question in deciding whether the freedom of speech rights should “trump” the
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Article I duties of Congress with respect to raising and maintaining military forces.224 The
dissent reaches the conclusion that the lawful acts of Congress in securing military enlistments is
not properly impeded by the willful conduct of the plaintiffs based on perceived injustices in the
otherwise lawful policies of the executive branch of the federal government. This conclusion is
especially true of a statute that is not directed at any particular viewpoint of suppression of any
particular viewpoint.225
None of the recently litigated decisions have reviewed the status of recruitment as
commercial speech. The Nomi court held in 1992 that commercial speech did not enjoy all the
protections of other types of political speech protected by the First Amendment.226 The court
expressly held that recruitment is commercial speech.227 The test for commercial speech is
“whether the speech proposes a commercial transaction.”228 There seems to have been an
assumption in the current litigation that the non-discrimination policies are fully protected
political speech. The law school policies, however, are directed at potential employers and
recruiters.229 The policies are directed toward who may recruit and how that recruitment is to be
carried out at the individual campuses. It was the law school in Nomi that argued that even “the
military must compete in the commercial marketplace.”230 The purpose of the law schools’ nondiscrimination policies in the current litigation is drenched in the commercial transaction of
employment. If this language is assumed to meet the commercial standards of Nomi, then the
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protections claimed under the First Amendment are not to be given the strict scrutiny treatment
required by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
These foregoing assumptions are all likely to be reviewed by the Court when it hears the
FAIR appeal in the 2005-2006 session. In the interim, Congress has reiterated its support for the
Solomon Amendment. In February 2005, the House of Representatives passed House Resolution
59, expressing continued support “for equal access of military recruiters to institutions of higher
education.”231 The debate over military policy regarding homosexuals in uniform is not likely to
be settled by the success or failure of the Solomon Amendment.232 The Court is likely to review
the Solomon Amendment for its value to the stated purpose of military recruiting. Facially, the
statute does not purport any viewpoint except support for the military’s end-strength goals and
the position of Congress that tax dollars should be spent where there is the greatest cooperation
with the nation’s needs for a quality self-defense force. If the Court begins with the assumptions
of constitutionality and the compelling interests of Congress compared to the lesser protected
rights for commercial speech, the Solomon Amendment is likely to be upheld.
IV. Impact
A. Schools
If the Solomon Amendment is upheld, the law schools do not have give up their policies; and
they should not. For schools that feel as strongly as the plaintiff schools in the current litigation,
a public statement in the form of school policy sends the strong message that is politically
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protected speech. Under the Solomon Amendment, the schools still have options with regard to
career placement. Namely, the schools that so desire may choose not to provide any recruitment
or career services on campus. The military would not be excluded or treated any differently than
other employers where no recruiting takes place. Instead, the likely outcome is that many of
these schools will choose to contract out their career placement to professional employment
companies. There are several beneficial outcomes for the schools in this option. First, the
school is free to find the most successful and prestigious employment companies to continue to
attract the best possible students. In a free market system, the best firms and companies will
compete to hire graduates from the law schools. Second, the law schools will no longer incur the
expenses of staff and space that career placement offices occupy. That savings can be returned
to the schools for other purposes. Third, it is possible that some contracts with employment
companies might include commissions back to the schools for strong placement candidates.
Since placement firms earn commissions from the eventual hiring employers, the law schools
might be able to encourage the contracting placement firms to split those commissions for
providing strong graduates. Finally, under contract situations, the law schools may provide more
than the information the Solomon Amendment requires be made available to the military
recruiters. Under the current law, the law schools will continue to be required to provide military
recruiters basic information on the current enrollment such as name and contact information. If
no other information is released to other potential employers, the schools will not be in violation
of the law by releasing only the minimum required by the Solomon Amendment. The law
schools need only advise and encourage their students that career placement services are
provided by a placement firm and step out of the Solomon Amendment fray.
A. Government
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The Solomon Amendment is unquestionably a values statement of Congress. Representative
Solomon’s frustration with the opposition of some institutions of higher education to the military
or military policies was not a new frustration in 1994. Congress had dealt with public animosity
toward the military policy during the late Vietnam era of the late 1960s and early 1970s. If
anything, Representative Solomon can be commended for his restraint in not attempting to force
recruiting on colleges and universities. The Spending Clause is a gentler way to persuade
schools to assist the government where they can while providing breathing room to make their
objections known. Not all schools will take advantage of the restraint embodied in the Solomon
Amendment. Where that is true, Congress would do well to shift some of its focus to other
productive programs that have supported governmental intentions.
Many schools do support the military recruitment purpose of the Solomon Amendment and
Congress could do more to support them. Specifically, Congress should implement a program of
support for cooperating schools modeled on the small business and minority business programs
that garner many federal contracts. The military will not stop gathering information on which
schools are the most productive recruiting grounds. Congress should take a more active role in
reviewing and using this information to create a preference program. The Department of
Defense should be directed to grow these relationships through the same grants and contracts
now provided to traditional large schools that are not always as cooperative. Smaller schools
should be encouraged to support the military and be rewarded for that support. Larger schools
that are not cooperative with the purposes of Congress should expect to be seen as poor business
partners with the government and lose their contracts.
The military should consider its recruiting program. The overhead of recruiting programs
may not be an appropriate mission of the military. The federal government already has an Office
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of Personnel Management. Perhaps the economies of scale of the federal government would be
best put to use in a single administrative office. If all executive branch recruiting were handled
by a single federal agency, the military might avoid some of the animosity it now endures on the
nation’s school campuses. Military recruiters could be detailed to the single agency for
discussions with potential candidates, but more of the field work could be done by government
recruiters in civilian attire to attract interested individuals to central, neutral locations to discuss
the myriad of options available in government employment. The cost savings to the military
should be substantial and the benefit to the potential employee is the chance to learn of work that
might not have ever occurred to him or her.
V. Conclusion
Military recruiting is problematic, especially in times of conflict. The Solomon Amendment
was a fair attempt by Congress to encourage schools to cooperate with the government in
meeting a task mandated to Congress by the Constitution. The First Amendment rights of the
nation’s schools are not violated where their message is only incidentally impacted by
government action. The Solomon Amendment should be upheld by the Supreme Court.
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